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Making the Grade - Can Pennsylvania's Private
Colleges and Universities Pass the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's Test of a Purely Public Charity?
INTRODUCTION
The American Red Cross, the United Way, and the Salvation
Army are all images that come to mind when one thinks of char-
ities. Yet, under the laws of most states, for the purposes of
qualifying for real estate tax exemption, most colleges, universi-
ties and other institutions of learning are also treated as public
charities.1 In addition, colleges and universities are exempt
from federal income tax under the Internal Revenue Code.2
However, the nature of the American education system, includ-
ing colleges and universities, has changed since these laws were
enacted. As a result, the courts are now confronted with the
issue of whether colleges and universities continue to fit the
definition of a "public charity," as provided by the statutes and
constitutions of various states, including Pennsylvania.
This comment addresses the issue of whether these institu-
tions, some of which have multi-billion dollar endowment funds
1. In Pennsylvania, the state constitution gives authority to the General As-
sembly to enact laws exempting "purely public" charities from taxation. See PA.
CONST., art. VIII, § 2(aXv). The legislature exercised this authority with the enact-
ment of the General County Assessment Law in 1933. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§
5020-1 to 5020-602 (1968 & Supp. 1994). Specifically, section 5020-204(a)(3) exempts
from "all county, city, borough, township, road, poor and school tax ... all...
universities, colleges, seminaries, academies, associations and institutions of learning,
benevolence, or charity." Id. § 5020-204(a)(3).
For a complete list of states that exempt educational institutions, schools,
colleges and universities from taxation, see Byron C. Keeling, Property Taxation of
Colleges and Universities: The Dilemma Posed by the Use of Facilities for Purposes
Unrelated to Education, 16 J.C. & U.L. 623, 624-26 & n.16 (1990).
2. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988). Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
provides a list of tax exempt organizations, including "[clorporations, and any com-
munity chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes."
I.R.C. § 501(cX3).
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and capital campaigns' and which charge thousands of dollars
for their services,' should be entitled to the tax exemption of a
"purely public charity," as defined by Pennsylvania law. Recent
decisions that have addressed this issue indicate that the tax
exempt status of private schools in Pennsylvania is in jeopardy.5
This comment explores whether such a result is warranted in
light of the traditional definition of "purely public charity" and
the changing face of American higher education.
THE INFLUENCE OF ENGLISH COMMON LAW ON EARLY
DEFINITIONS OF "PURELY PUBLIC CHARITY"
The concept of a purely public charity in Pennsylvania dates
back to the adoption of the Pennsylvania Constitution in 1784,
which gave the legislature the authority to pass laws exempting
"institutions of purely public charity" from taxation.' Pursuant
to that constitutional provision, the Pennsylvania General As-
sembly enacted the Act of May 14, 1874 (the "Act of 1874"),
which exempted, among other organizations, all hospitals, uni-
versities and institutions of learning from taxation.7 In applying
the provisions of the Act of 1874 to various organizations, the
Pennsylvania courts began to formulate a definition of purely
public charity.
In formulating the definition of purely public charity, the
early decisions were guided by a seventeenth century English
3. In 1988, Harvard University had an endowment fund valued at 4.2 billion
dollars. Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL
STUD. 3 (1990). Yale university's endowment fund was valued at 2.1 billion dollars.
Id.
4. Six percent of college students attend institutions where the tuition is
$10,000 or more. Derek Bok, What's Wrong With Our Universities?, 14 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POLY 305, 322 (1991). Fourteen percent attend private schools where the tui-
tion is less than $10,000, and 80 percent of the country's college students attend
public universities where tuition averages less than $2,000 per year. Id.
5. See, e.g., City of Washingon v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Washing-
ton County, 74 Wash. Cty. Rep. 114 (1994) [hereinafter Washington & Jefferson]. For
a discussion of this case, see notes 106-09 and 112-19 and accompanying text.
6. PA. CONST. of 1874, art. IX, § 1. The 1874 Constitution provided that "[aili
taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, . . . but the General Assem-
bly may, by general laws, exempt from taxation ... institutions of purely public
charity." Id.
7. Act of May 14, 1874, No. 94, 1874 Pa. Laws 158. Specifically, the act ex-
empted from taxation, "all hospitals, universities ... and institutions of learning,
benevolence or charity, with the grounds thereto annexed, and necessary for the
occupancy and enjoyment of the same, founded, endowed, or maintained by public or
private charity." Id. The Act of 1874 was one of the predecessors to the current
General County Assessment Law. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-1 to 5020-602.
See note 1 for the relevant provision of the General County Assessment Law.
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statute called the Statute of Charitable Uses.' Entitled "[an Act
to redress the misemployment of lands, goods and flocks of mon-
ey heretofore given to certain charitable uses," the statute listed
in its preamble certain activities which were deemed to be for
charitable purposes.9 Among the purposes listed by the statute
were "the relief of aged, impotent and poor people" and the
"maintenance of. .. schools of learning, free schools, and schol-
ars in universities."0
In 1878, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was confronted in
Donohugh's Appeal" with the issue of whether a library was a
purely public charity under the Act of 1874.12 In Donohugh's
Appeal, the Library Company of Philadelphia (the "Company")
brought an action in equity against the tax collector of Phila-
delphia.'" The Company had been founded in 1731 by, among
others, Benjamin Franklin as "an institution for the advance-
ment of learning and the more useful dissemination of
knowledge." 4 It brought a declaratory judgment action seeking
classification as a purely public charity and as an institution for
learning, benevolence or charity." The lower court awarded the
declaratory judgment, holding that the company was not only an
institution of learning, but also a charity "within the long-settled
and clearly-defined legal meaning of that term."' The Compa-
ny was therefore entitled to a tax exemption under the Act of
1874."7 In affirming the trial court's decision, the Supreme
Court adopted the lower court's opinion. 8
The trial court in Donohugh's Appeal also addressed the issue
of whether the legislature had gone beyond its constitutional
8. 43 Eliz., ch .4 (1601).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 86 Pa. 306 (1878).
12. Donohugh'a Appeal, 86 Pa. at 307.
13. Id.
14. Id. The Company was the trustee for the Logarian Library, a collection of
books exceeding 100,000 volumes. Id. The library was maintained by the contribu-
tions of members, income derived by donated property and fees from non-members.
Id. All the profits earned by the company were used to purchase more books. Id.
15. Id. at 308.
16. Id at 309. The court did not expound, however, on this long settled and
clearly defined legal meaning.
17. Donohugha Appeal, 86 Pa. at 309. The court noted that the legislation had
been passed to carry into effect the constitutional provision, as the constitution itself
did not exempt specific property from taxation, but only enabled the legislature to
do so. Id. at 309-10.
18. Id. at 317-18. The supreme court's opinion was per curiam. Id. at 317. The
court noted that the lower court's opinion was so well written, nothing needed to be
added to it. Id. at 318.
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authority in enacting the Act of 1874 by extending the words
"institutions of purely public charity" to include "institutions of
learning."19 Concluding that the Act was constitutional, the
court defined each element of a purely public charity. According
to the court, a "charity," when used in relation to charitable gifts
or institutions, meant "good-will, benevolence [and a] desire to
add to the happiness or improvement of our fellow-beings."0 In
addition, it defined a "public" charity as a charity not for the
benefit of certain individuals, but for the benefit of the indefinite
public.21 Finally, the court stated that "purely" meant "com-
pletely, entirely, and unqualifiedly."' A purely public charity
was therefore an institution formed for the accomplishment of a
public purpose and not for private or individual gain.' Thus,
motive was an essential part of one of the earliest definitions of
purely public charity.
In Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd,' the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania once again attempted to define purely public char-
ity.2" In Fire Insurance Patrol, the plaintiff filed suit against
the Fire Insurance Patrol Board (the "Board"), alleging that the
Board was vicariously liable for the negligence of its employ-
ees.' The Board defended on the grounds that it was a charita-
ble institution and, therefore, not liable for the acts of its em-
ployees." The trial court held that the Board was not a charita-
ble institution, because the Board had an economic motive to
benefit insurance companies by reducing the losses caused by
fire.'
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the trial court and
stated that the true test of whether an institution was a purely
public charity was the object sought to be attained and the pur-
pose to which the money was to be applied, not the motive of the
donor.9 The court, therefore, concluded that because the Board
served a public purpose in protecting the public from fires, 30 it
was a charitable institution, notwithstanding the motives of its
19. Id. at 312.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 313.
22. Donohugh's Appeal, 86 Pa. at 314.
23. Id.
24. 15 A. 553 (Pa. 1888).
25. Fire Ins. Patrol, 15 A. at 554-56.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 556.
28. Id. at 554.
29. Id. at 556. The objective of the Board, as provided by its charter, was "to
protect and save life and property in or contiguous to burning buildings." Id. at 554.
30. Fire Ins. Patrol, 15 A. at 556.
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contributors to help insurance companies." Fire Insurance Pa-
trol broadened the definition of public charity to exclude any
consideration of motive and thereby increased the number of
organizations which could qualify as "purely public charities."
The next significant development in the definition of a purely
public charity came in 1892 in Trustees of Academy of Protestant
Episcopal Church v. Taylor.32 In deciding whether the academy
was entitled to a tax exemption, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court followed the law of Fire Insurance Patrol by focusing on
the purpose of the institution, which was to educate children.'
The court noted that Pennsylvania courts had traditionally re-
lied on the Statute of Charitable Uses in recognizing the educa-
tion of youth and support of schools as a charitable purpose."
The court further stated that "[wihatever is gratuitously done or
given in relief of the public burdens or for the advancement of
the public good is a public charity.' Finding that the school fit
this definition and that it had complied with the other require-
ments of the Act of 1874, the court held that it was entitled to
exemption from taxation. 6
Guided by the list of charitable purposes in the Statute of
Charitable Uses, the definition of purely public charity in Penn-
sylvania had evolved to focus on the purpose or object sought to
be achieved by the institution claiming to fit the definition.
Thus, in 1894, in City of Philadelphia v. Masonic Home of Penn-
sylvania,7 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied tax ex-
empt status to a home for indigent, afflicted and aged per-
sons." The residents of the home were incapable of supporting
themselves, and the court reasoned that the home benefitted
only a small number of people belonging to a voluntary associa-
tion, not the public at large."9 Although it recognized the home
31. Id.
32. 25 A. 55 (Pa. 1892) [hereinafter Episcopal Academy]. Trustees of the acad-
emy had brought suit to enjoin the collection of taxes assessed against its property.
Episcopal Academy, 25 A. at 55.
33. Episcopal Academy, 25 A. at 56.
34. Id. The court also noted that the education of youth and support of
schools advanced the public good, and that money given for such purposes was rec-
ognized as a charitable use before the enactment of the Statute of Charitable Uses.
Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 57. The court also determined that the school was founded, endowed
and maintained by public or private charity. Id. This was necessary to qualify for a
tax exemption under the Act of 1874. See Act of May 14, 1874, No. 94, 1874 Pa.
Laws 158.
37. 28 A. 954 (Pa. 1894).
38. Masonic Home, 28 A. at 955-56.
39. Id. at 955. The right to admission in the home was dependent on a
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as a charity, the court concluded that it was not a purely public
charity.40 The court stated that in order for a charity to be a
purely public charity, "there must be no admixture of any quali-
fication for admission, heterogeneous, and not solely relating to
the public."4'
The list of activities deemed to be for a charitable purpose,
however, was not short. In In re Kimberly's Estate,42 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court acknowledged that the list offered by
the Statute of Charitable Uses was not conclusive.' Kimberly's
Estate dealt with the construction of a testamentary trust, which
directed trustees to use and apply certain monies for "charitable
uses, objects and purposes."" At issue was whether some of the
beneficiaries of these monies were charities and whether the
gifts which had been given to them were consistent with the
provisions of the will.'5 The Attorney General claimed that cer-
tain donations made by the trustees of the estate, were not
made to charitable organizations for charitable purposes.' The
court asserted that the guiding rule in determining what consti-
tuted a charitable purpose was not to circumscribe the operation
of the statute.47
DEVELOPMENT OF THE HU1 TEST -
ELEMENTS OF A PURELY PUBLIC CHARITY
The next important development in the law of "purely public
charities" was the enactment of the General County Assessment
Law (the "Assessment Law") in 1933. 4" The Assessment Law
person's membership. Id.
40. Id. at 955-56. In recognizing the home as a charity, the court stated that
charity was defined as "a gift to promote the welfare of others." Id at 955.
41. Id.
42. 95 A. 86 (Pa. 1915).
43. Kimberly's Estate, 95 A. at 88. An auditor for the estate had examined the
contributions to determine if they were consistent with the provisions of the will. Id.
at 87-88. In writing its opinion, the court adopted most of the language and findings
contained in the auditor's report. Id. at 88.
44. Id. at 87.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 88.
48. Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306 (Pa. 1985)
[hereinafter HUP]. See notes 75-91 and accompanying text for a complete discussion
of HUP.
49. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 5020-1 to 5020-602 (1968 & Supp. 1994).
See note 1 for the relevant portion of the General County Assessment Law. The law
was enacted to amend, revise and consolidate "all laws designating the subjects,




exempted certain real property from taxation, including real
property owned by institutions of purely public charity."
In 1936, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania interpreted the
Assessment law in YMCA of Germantown v. City of Philadel-
phia.51 In YMCA of Germantown, the appellant sought to have
its property wholly exempted from taxation. 2 The Board of Re-
vision of Taxes of the County of Philadelphia (the "Board of
Revisions") exempted a portion of the YMCA property but taxed
the remainder." The YMCA appealed the board's decision to
the court of common pleas, claiming that it was a purely public
charity and as such, was entitled to a tax exemption for all the
assessed property.' After the court of common pleas had up-
held the Board of Revision's assessment, the YMCA appealed to
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.55
In keeping with precedent, the court first addressed the
YMCA's purpose, which was stated in its charter as the "moral
and intellectual improvement of young men."" It then turned
to the construction of the Assessment Law. Relying on its deci-
sions interpreting the Act of 1874, the court asserted that an
organization seeking an exemption from taxation had the burden
of showing affirmative legislation supporting its claim and also
had to show that it was part of the class intended to benefit
from the legislation.57 In determining that the YMCA had not
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-204(aX9). In addition to exempting the prop-
erty of hospitals and institutions of learning, the statute exempted from "all county,
city, borough, town, road, township, poor, and school tax... all real property
owned by one or more institutions of purely public charity . . . and necessary for
the occupancy and enjoyment of such institutions using it." Id.
51. 187 A. 204 (Pa. 1936), overruled in part by West Allegheny Hospital v.
Board of Property Assessment, Appeals & Review, 455 A.2d 1170, 1173 (Pa. 1982).
52. YMCA of Germantown, 187 A. at 205.
53. Id. Three-fifths of the assessed valuation was exempted; two-fifths was
taxed. Id. The board argued that although it agreed the YMCA was a purely chari-
table institution, it also operated a rooming house from which it derived revenue. Id.
Thus, the portion of the property used for the operation of the rooming house was
not entitled to the tax exemption. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. The Chancellor who heard the case at the common pleas level entered
a decree of total exemption for the YMCA. Id. The common pleas court sitting en
bans, however, did not agree and reinstated the Board's ruling. Id. at 206.
56. Id. The YMCA constitution also stated that the organization's purpose in
forming was to promote the "spiritual, mental, social and physical improvement of
young men." Id.
57. YMCA of Germantown, 187 A. at 208 (quoting Philadelphia v. Barber, 28
A. 644 (Pa. 1894)). The court also noted that the language of the Assessment Law
was the same as that of the Act of 1874, with the exception of the words
"[pirovided, that the entire revenue derived by the same be applied to the support
and to increase the efficiency and facilities thereof, the repair and the necessary
increase of grounds and buildings thereof, and for no other purpose." YMCA of Ger-
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sustained its burden, the court held that an institution claiming
to be benevolent or charitable for the purposes of obtaining an
exemption from taxation must "possess an eleemosynary charac-
teristic not possessed by institutions or property devoted to pri-
vate gain or profit.""
In addition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in YMCA of
Germantown for the first time developed a specific test to deter-
mine when an institution was a purely public charity. Noting
that earlier courts had tended to create a liberal construction of
the term in order to favor and reward institutions for doing
noble work, the court stated that in order to be a public charity,
an organization must meet the following criteria: 1) "whatever it
does for others is done free of charge or... nearly free of
charge";59 and 2) those to whom the institution gave assistance
had to be "legitimate subjects of charity.' ° The court's decision
in YMCA of Germantown also diminished the importance of
having a charitable purpose, stating that the use of all its pro-
ceeds for charitable purposes did not in and of itself make an
institution a purely public charity."'
Returning to broad definitions, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in 1946 attempted to define charitable purpose. In Funk
Estate,2 the court, in interpreting a will, asserted that there
was no limitation on the number of charitable uses.6 The court
decided that whether a use was charitable should be determined
from all the surrounding circumstances,6 and that in its most
general sense, a charitable use was something done for the ben-
efit of the fellow man or the public. 5
mantown, 187 A. at 207. It further noted that this additional language did not ren-
der inapplicable its previous decisions interpreting the Act of 1874. Id.
58. YMCA of Germantown, 187 A. at 208.
59. Id. at 209. This requirement was overruled by the Supreme Court in West
Allegheny Hospital where the court stated that, "(sluch a requirement clearly con-
flicts with the evident intent ... to accommodate evolving institutional needs.* West
Allegheny Hospital, 455 A.2d at 1173.
60. YMCA of Germantown, 187 A. at 209.
61. Id. at 209. The court also hinted that another criteria for being a public
charity was relieving the government of a burden, although it did not specifically
include it as a requirement. Id. at 210. In explaining the policy behind exempting
public charities from taxation, the court said that public charities relieve the govern-
ment of a burden, and that relieving charities of the burden of taxation was there-
fore a quid pro quo. Id.
62. 45 A.2d 67 (Pa. 1946).
63. Funk Estate, 45 A.2d at 69. (quoting In re Tollinger's Estate, 37 A.2d 500,
502 (Pa. 1944)). At issue in the case was whether a residual gift in the will was too
vague. Funk Estate, 45 A.2d at 69.
64. Funk Estate, 45 A.2d at 69 (quoting Tollinger, 87 A.2d at 502).
65. Funk Estate, 45 A.2d at 69 (quoting Taylor v. Hoag, 116 A. 826 (Pa.
1922)).
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania once again assessed the
applicability of the Assessment Law in In re Ogontz School."
In deciding the case, the court effectively added another element
to the definition of public charity which it had developed in
YMCA of Germantown. Although it considered the school's edu-
cational purpose, as stated in its charter, the court held the
school not to be a purely public charity because it did not relieve
the government of any of its burdens.67 As to whether the
school provided free services, the court pointed to the fact that
scholarships amounted to only ten percent of the total fees paid
by students." In addition, the court found that the school's pur-
pose was not charitable, but that it was engaged in a commer-
cial enterprise. 9
Subsequently, in In re Hill School,70 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court added yet another element to the equation of what
constitutes a purely public charity.71 Addressing the issue of
what effect the word "purely" has on the term purely public
charity, the court asserted that a purely public charity had to be
entirely free from a profit motive.72 Realizing that the mere
receipt of payment for services did not preclude an institution
from being a purely public charity, the court concluded that an
organization crossed the boundary into the realm of taxation
when it entered the commercial field and engaged in business.7"
Adopting the findings of the lower court judge, the court held
that the school was entitled to a tax exemption. 4
66. 65 A.2d 150 (Pa. 1949). The appellant in Ogontz School was the Abington
Township School District, which had appealed the decision of the Montgomery Coun-
ty Board of Assessment and Revision of Taxes to exempt from taxation property
owned by the Ogontz School. Ogontz School, 65 A.2d at 150. After the Montgomery
County Court of Common Pleas had dismissed the appeal, the township and school
district appealed to the supreme court. Id.
67. Ogontz School, 65 A.2d at 153. The stated purpose of the school was to
maintain, support and operate a school for the education of young men and women
without profit. Id. at 151. In emphasizing the question of whether the school re-
lieved the government of burdens, the court relied on the language of YMCA of
Germantown. Id. at 154.
68. Id. at 153.
69. Id. at 154-55.
70. 87 A.2d 259 (Pa. 1952).
71. Hill School, 87 A.2d at 263.
72. Id. at 262-63. The court recognized, however, that the charging of tuition
by a school or university did not alone remove it from the umbrella of tax exemp-
tion. Id. at 263.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 264. The court relied on the following factors: 1) the cost of educa-
tion provided by the school was more than the amount of tuition charged; 2) no one
received any profit or gain from the school's operations; and 3) the school was the
recipient of donations. Id.
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As the foregoing cases indicate, the definition of purely public
charity had evolved, by the middle of the twentieth century, to
include specific criteria that institutions were required to meet
in order to receive tax exempt status. However, the courts were
not consistent in determining which criteria were determinative
of the issue. In addition, the courts placed less emphasis on the
fact that an organization's purpose was to benefit the communi-
ty in determining whether it was a purely public charity.
In the 1985 seminal decision of Hospital Utilization Project
('HUP") v. Commonwealth,75 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
established a five part test for determining when an institution
was a purely public charity and therefore entitled to tax exemp-
tion under the Pennsylvania Constitution." The court held that
an institution would qualify for tax exempt status as a purely
public charity if it:
(a) Advances a charitable purpose;
(b) Donates or renders gratuitously a substantial portion of its services;
(c) Benefits a substantial and indefinite class of persons who are legiti-
mate subjects of charity;
(d) Relieves the government of some of its burden; and
(e) Operates entirely free from private profit motive."
The institution in HUP had requested a refund of sales and
use taxes from the Commonwealth's Department of Revenue
Board of Appeals, claiming that it was entitled to the refund
because it was a charitable organization." The Board of Appeals
75. 487 A.2d 1306 (Pa. 1985).
76. HUP, 487 A.2d at 1317.
77. Id. In developing the test, the court reviewed the various definitions it had
assigned to purely public charity in the past and consolidated those different mean-
ings into one test with several elements. Id. Specifically, the court stated that
"[allthough the term 'purely public charity' has not been defined with exactness
under Pennsylvania law, case law has provided criteria by which we can set forth
the parameters of a 'purely public charity.' Id. at 1312.
78. Id. at 1309. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7204 (1990). A charitable organi-
zation is defined as follows:
[A] group or body of persons which is created and which exists for the pur-
pose of performing a humane service; promoting the good and welfare of the
aged, poor, infirm, or distressed; combating juvenile delinquency or advancing
the spiritual, mental, social, and physical improvement of young men and
women. A foundation or fund organized to provide for the advancement of
education or science is also included in the term charitable organization. The
persons entitled to benefit from services performed by such an organization
shall be chosen from a class of persons substantial and not predetermined in
number. The funds of such an organization shall be primarily derived from
public or private contributions, and the organization shall be operated without
pecuniary benefit to any officer, member, or shareholder, except as reasonable
compensation for actual services rendered to the organization.
61 PA. CODE § 32.1 (1990).
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denied the petition on the basis that HUP was not a "charitable
organization."' Both the Board of Finance and Revenue and the
commonwealth court subsequently affirmed the denial of the
petition for refund, and HUP timely appealed to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania.' The supreme court recognized the defi-
nition of a "charitable organization" in determining whether HUP
was entitled to a refund of its sales and use taxes."1 It conclud-
ed, however, that the origin of the exemption was the constitu-
tional provision which authorized laws exempting purely public
charities from taxation. 2 Thus, the Tax Reform Code, which
exempted charitable organizations from sales and use taxes,
could only apply to entities that also met the definition of a pure-
ly public charity, as that term was used in the Pennsylvania
Constitution.'
The court ultimately held that HUP did not satisfy the five-
part test used to determine whether an organization was a pure-
ly public charity." First, the court stated that HUP's purpose in
promoting quality health care and the effective use of health care
services, though commendable, was not charitable.' Next, it
concluded that the organization did not render its services gratu-
itously because all of its clients were required to pay fees approx-
imating actual cost." In addition, HUP's beneficiaries - hospi-
tals and health care providers - were not legitimate subjects of
charity. 7 Applying the last two parts of the test, the court found
that HUP's activities did not relieve the government of any bur-
den," and because it could not be distinguished from any other
commercial enterprise, HUP had not proven that it was free from
profit motive."
The court's decision in HUP signalled a significant change in
79. HUP, 487 A-2d at 1309.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1311.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1312.
84. HUP, 487 A.2d at 1319. The court did not reach the question of whether
HUP was a charitable organization. Id. at 1312.
85. Id. at 1317.
86. Id.
87. Id. The court stated that the beneficiaries of HUP were its clients, not the
general public. Id. at 1314.
88. Id. at 1317. HUP had argued that if it did not provide the research, as it
had been doing, the government would have to do it. Id. However, the court found
that the type of research done by HUP was not the type traditionally done by the
government. Id.
89. HUP, 487 A.2d at 1318. The court pointed to the fact that the directors




determining whether an institution was a purely public charity
for purposes of qualifying for a real estate tax exemption in
Pennsylvania.' For the first time, a concrete and complete defi-
nition of purely public charity was established. Yet, this five-
tiered definition was purportedly merely a compilation of various
factors that had already been well established by precedent and
often used to determine if an entity was a purely public chari-
ty. 1 Why, then, did the HUP decision have such an impact? The
answer is simple. Instead of considering one or two factors in
deciding the issue, as a result of the HUP decision, courts were
now required to consider all factors previously recognized by
precedent in determining whether an entity was a purely public
charity.
APPLICATION OF PURELY PUBLIC CHARITY TO
INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING
Having established how the definition of "purely private chari-
ty" evolved, this comment now turns to how the HUP definition
applies to private colleges and universities. It should first be
noted that although providing education to students has been
recognized as a charitable purpose since the Statute of Chari-
table Uses,92 the Pennsylvania courts have never taken the posi-
tion that a school, college or university, because it was educating
people, was a purely public charity per se. This was evident as
early as the supreme court's decision in Donohugh's Appeal.'
The court held in Donohugh's Appeal that a library was both an
institution of learning and a public charity, thereby recognizing
the distinction between the two.'
As jurisprudence developed, most courts recognized, however,
that schools usually met the required tests for determining what
is a purely public charity." As schools began to change, the
courts also took note of the changes and in some cases, denied
them tax exempt status." The courts took the following factors
into consideration in deciding whether to deny tax exempt status
to schools: 1) the amount of tuition in relation to costs; 2) the
90. The court, however, downplayed the significance of the case, stating that it
had simply adhered to a long line of case law. Id.
91. Id. at 1317.
92. 43 Eliz., ch.4 (1601). See notes 8-10 for a discussion of the Statute of
Charitable Uses.
93. 86 Pa. 306 (1878). See notes 11-23 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Donohugh's Appeal.
94. Donohugh's Appeal, 86 Pa. at 309.
95. See, e.g., In re Hill School, 87 A.2d 259, 264 (Pa. 1952).
96. See, e.g., In re Ogontz School, 65 A.2d 150, 154-55 (Pa. 1949).
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percentage of students attending on scholarship; and 3) the pres-
ence of a commercial enterprise.97
In 1972, in Robert Morris College v. Board of Property Assess-
ment, Appeals & Review," the Commonwealth Court of Pennsyl-
vania addressed the issue of whether Robert Morris College was
a purely public charity and thus entitled to tax exempt status."
The court asserted that prior law required that, in order to quali-
fy for tax exempt status, an institution must meet the following
criteria: "(1) [the institution] is one of 'purely public charity'; (2)
[it] was founded by public or private charity; (3) [it] is main-
tained by public or private charity."' The court qualified these
requirements somewhat, concluding that the school was not re-
quired to have been a purely public charity at its inception, as
long as it was transformed into one at some later date.'0 ' How-
ever, the court ultimately denied the tax exempt status to the
college because it held that the school was not maintained by
public or private charity, due to the small amount of money ex-
pended for scholarships.'
Four years later, the supreme court expounded on the com-
monwealth court's holding in Robert Morris in Point Park Junior
College v. Board of Assessment & Appeals."'3 In Point Park, the
court noted that in order to receive tax exempt status, the school
requesting the exemption had to prove the following: "(1) that
there is some significant charitable support for the school; (2)
that the school has rendered significant charitable services to the
public by way of scholarship aid to students; and (3) that the
school's income was expended for its educational purpose without
the accumulation of unappropriated surpluses."'"
Thus, even before HUP was decided, courts were closely scruti-
nizing institutions of learning that were requesting tax exempt
status. As the decision in Hill School' indicated, however,
most schools were not in danger of losing their tax exempt sta-
tus. Tuition prices were still low in relation to cost, and higher
education had not achieved the "Big Business" quality that is so
97. See notes 65-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of earlier cases in-
volving tax exemptions for schools.
98. 291 A.2d 567 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972).
99. Robert Morris, 291 A.2d at 569.
100. Id. at 572 (quoting In re Woods Schools, 178 A.2d 600, 602 (Pa. 1962)).
101. Robert Morris, 291 A.2d at 574.
102. Id. at 575.
103. 351 A.2d 707 (Pa. 1976).
104. Point Park, 351 A.2d at 710.
105. In re Hill School, 87 A.2d 259 (Pa. 1952). See notes 70-74 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of Hill School.
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prevalent today. That situation would soon drastically change.
In 1994, the Washington County Court of Common Pleas held
in Washington & Jefferson,"re that Washington and Jefferson
College was not entitled to tax exempt status."7 Applying the
HUP test, the court determined that the college only met one of
the five prongs - that it was operating without a profit mo-
tive.1' 8
As to the other prongs of the test, the court first found that the
school did not advance a charitable purpose because students
unable to pay for their education were not permitted to remain
enrolled.' 9 In reaching its decision, the court discussed the
college's reliance on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent
decision in In re St. Margaret Seneca Place v. Board of Property
Assessment, Appeals & Review."0 In Seneca Place, the supreme
court held that a nursing home was entitled to tax exempt sta-
tus."' The Washington & Jefferson court distinguished Seneca
Place, however, on the basis that unlike the nursing home, which
was "committed to serv[ing] all applicants regardless of their
financial means or availability of insurance," Washington and
Jefferson College had refused to allow students to attend classes
due to their inability to pay."
2
The court also concluded that Washington and Jefferson Col-
lege did not donate a substantial portion of its services because
only a small portion of financial aid given by the school was mer-
it based."' Additionally, the school did not benefit a class of
persons who were a legitimate subject of charity."14 The court
explained that although eighty percent of the students who at-
106. 74 Wash. Cty. Rep. 114 (1994).
107. Washington & Jefferson, 74 Wash. Cty. Rep. at 127.
108. Id. at 125. The court noted that payment of salaries and other benefits to
college officials did not establish a profit motive. Id. Furthermore, the college did not
distribute dividends or profits. Id.
109. Id. at 121.
110. Id. (citing St. Margaret Seneca Place v. Board of Property Assessment,
Appeals & Review, 640 A.2d 380 (Pa. 1994)).
111. Seneca Place, 640 A.2d at 385-86.
112. Washington & Jefferson, 74 Wash. Cty. Rep. at 121-22. In distinguishing
the two cases, the court stated specifically that the nursing home in Seneca Place,
had paid out of its own pocket one-third the cost of care for those patients who
were unable to pay. Id. at 121. Washington and Jefferson College, however, received
75 percent of its educational and general expenditures from tuition and fees and
offered only five full scholarships annually. Id.
113. Id. at 122. The school argued that it did donate a substantial portion of
its services because it had paid out 3.9 and 5.4 million dollars in scholarships and
other financial aid in 1992 and 1993, respectively. Id. However, only $797,215 in
1992 and $902,310 in 1993 was awarded without regard to financial need. Id.
114. Id. at 124.
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tended Washington and Jefferson College received financial aid,
this did not make these students "legitimate subjects of chari-
ty.""' The court stated that the students were not "needy" and
were unlike the patients of the nursing home in Seneca Place,
who were in need of institutional care."' Finally, the court
ruled that because local and state governments were not required
to provide post-secondary education to their citizens, the college
had failed to meet the fourth prong of the test of relieving the
government of a burden."7
In Washington & Jefferson, the court hinted that there were
policy reasons for such a strict application of HUP to colleges and
universities."' According to the court, the increased number of
properties that have received tax-exempt status was one reason
why many cities face financial difficulties and were unable to
provide adequate police and fire protection to their citizens."'
The court noted that the municipal loss could be great when
schools, churches and hospitals claim exemptions. 2 ' The ratio-
nale for denying such exemptions makes even more sense when
the institution seeking the exemption epitomizes the big business
attitude and environment that American higher education has
adopted and become.
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 1990s -
ITS CHARACTER AND CRITICS
Today, American higher education is a 100 billion dollar indus-
try. 2 ' This is not only the result of rising costs and tuition, but
is also the result of the increasing number of people attending
school beyond the high school level."' Along with the growth of
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Washington & Jefferson, 74 Wash. Cty. Rep. at 125.
118. Id. at 127.
119. Id.
120. Id. In Washington, Pennsylvania, where Washington and Jefferson College
is located, 27 percent of the city's real estate is tax exempt. Bill Hetzel, Washington
and Jefferson Loses its Exemption from State Taxes, PrIrSBURGH POST GAZETTE, Aug.
7, 1994, at El, E2. Consequently, if the court decision in Washington & Jefferson
stands, the city of Washington could realize $74,000 to $115,000 in new tax revenue.
Id.
121. A. Kenneth Pye, What's Wrong With Our Universities? - An Additional
View (American Education: Legal and Policy Issues), 14 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y
335, 337 (1991).
122. The United States has a higher percentage of young people attending col-
lege than any other nation in the world. Pye, cited at note 121, at 337. Sixty per-
cent of high school graduates will enroll at some time in a post secondary institu-
tion. Id. In addition, the number of persons 25 years and older completing college
has risen from 11 percent in 1970 to 21 percent in 1992. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
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higher education has also come criticism by many who argue that
America's institutions of higher learning no longer aspire to culti-
vate and educate young minds in the quest for knowledge and
understanding, but rather have sold their souls in the quest for
the almighty dollar. 2 '
A look at the figures makes it easy to see the basis for this
criticism. The cost of an education has risen in recent years at a
rate much higher than the rate of inflation. In 1975, the average
cost of tuition and fees at a four-year college was $599 per aca-
demic year.'24 By 1991, that figure had risen to $11,379.'
Due to the increase in costs, many students are financing their
college educations. Consequently, the number of student loans
has drastically increased. For example, an estimated 5,551
Stafford loans were made to students in 1993, compared to just
1,017 in 1970.126 The amount of funds utilized by these loans
rose from just over one million dollars in 1970 to an estimated
16.5 million dollars in 1993.127 Yet, some argue these figures
are justified due to advancements in technology and increased
competitiveness between institutions of higher education.'
According to Derek Bok, former President of Harvard Universi-
ty, the increase in the cost of a college education has been caused
by advancements in technology and improved equipment."2 Al-
though the public may see red when it sees the multi-billion
dollar figures, Bok argues that America's higher education sys-
tem cannot achieve excellence without the correlating funds.' °
With an advance in technology comes an increase in cost. The
very best equipment is needed to turn out the very best students.
In addition to advancements in technology, the increased com-
petitiveness of colleges and universities has also added to the
increased cost of higher education. 3' As Bok explains, to retain
the competitive edge over other institutions, colleges and univer-
sities need to attract quality students and faculty, which requires
more modern facilities such as state-of-the-art laboratories and
libraries.'32 Yet he notes that the money colleges spend to at-
THE UNITED STATES 145 (113th ed. 1993).
123. See ALLAN BLOOM, CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987).
124. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, cited at note 122, at 179.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 178.
127. Id.
128. Bok, cited at note 4, at 326-27.
129. Id.
130. ld. at 327-28.




tract quality students cannot be justified by the need to inform
prospective students about the opportunities available and the
facilities at their school. 3 But even if these costs can be justi-
fied, why do people see a problem with higher education's empha-
sis on revenue and economic results?
Bok believes the problem arises from public expectations about
what colleges and universities should be doing.' Americans
want their system of higher education to be the best in the world,
as it is now widely regarded. 1" As Bok states, "[wie want our
universities to produce research of a quality second to none so
that we can enlarge our knowledge, renew our culture, and pro-
duce new insights to help us conquer disease, promote technologi-
cal progress, and overcome our social problems.""
Yet, to meet these needs, schools must often turn to methods,
such as aggressive capital campaigns and high priced
fundraisers, that do not conform to traditional notions of acade-
mia. 37 The combination of pressure from the public and the
need for resources to meet those expectations creates a dilemma
for colleges and universities." Resolving this dilemma may re-
quire institutions to take courses of action, such as massive
fundraising campaigns, that are often inconsistent with the per-
ceived more esoteric functions of institutions of higher learn-
ing.3 9 The key, according to Bok, is to strike a balance."
Schools should obtain the funds and resources that are neces-
sary, but in doing so, they should not ignore the higher purpose
of education, which is to "prepare [students] to live productive
lives; to be knowledgeable, critical members of our democratic
society; and to appreciate, as fully as possible, the human experi-
ence and the world around them."'4 '
133. Bok, cited at note 4, at 311.
134. Id. at 327-28.
135. Derek Bok, The Future of Higher Education in America, N.Y. ST. B. J.,
April 1987, at 36. Bok states that American higher education consists of a network
of universities "widely recognized as the finest in the world in the fruits of their
research, the quality of their professional training, their accessibility to a wide spec-
trum of the population, and the variety of programs they offer to meet the needs of
a huge and diverse student population." Id. at 37.
136. Bok, cited at note 4, at 309.








The drift away from academic excellence toward an emphasis
on monetary value is what has stirred critics of higher education
to voice their complaints. This trend is not only detrimental to
the people who are served by higher education, but it is also
detrimental to the institutions themselves. As Bok states, "when
universities act in ways inconsistent with the pursuit of educa-
tion, they do not merely compromise their mission; they threaten
reservoirs of confidence and trust on which their welfare ulti-
mately depends."142 In addition, the lack of focus on education
affects the public by depriving it of the benefit that the education
of its youth should bring.4
When schools start to ignore that they are primarily education-
al institutions and thus, stop providing a benefit to the public,
the consequences should realistically include loss of tax exempt
status. Notwithstanding HUP, an institution of learning that
fails to educate or at the minimum, relegates education to a sec-
ondary status, would not have even met the early common law
definition of a purely public charity, as set forth by Donohugh's
Appeal.'" In that sense, an application of HUP to deny tax ex-
empt status would not be historically inappropriate.
The effects of such an application of HUP on American higher
education, however, would be drastic. If the costs seem high now,
imagine what the imposition of multi-million dollar tax liabilities
will do to the price of tuition. Some schools will probably be un-
able to pay the taxes and will be forced to close. There will be
fewer schools for the growing student population. Subsequently,
the demand for a quality education will increase and this too will
cause costs to rise. So, what are the alternatives?
When the controversy over Washington and Jefferson College's
tax exempt status began three years ago, the college was not the
only institution whose tax-exempt status was challenged. The
city of Washington, Pennsylvania also challenged Washington
Hospital's tax exempt status.'45 Unlike Washington and Jeffer-
son College, however, the hospital settled."6 In settling, the
hospital agreed to pay the city $40,000 per year for the next eight
142. Derek Bok, Universitiea: Their Temptations and Tensions, 18 J.C. & U.L.
1, 2 (1991).
143. Bok, cited at note 142, at 3.
144. 86 Pa. 306 (1878). See notes 12-23 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Donohugh's Appeal.




years.147 Not only did the hospital avoid a much larger tax lia-
bility by settling, it also avoided the cost of a long expensive legal
battle. The option of settling is probably one that schools should
consider to reduce the financial effects of large tax liabilities they
will incur if they lose their tax exempt status.
As to redefining purely public charity, the schools can always
wait and see if the supreme court is going to alter its course. But
this appears unlikely. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
decision in Seneca Place14 indicated, the HUP test is embedded
in Pennsylvania jurisprudence."9 In Seneca Place, although the
court reversed a commonwealth court decision which had denied
the nursing home a tax exemption, it applied the HUP test and
held that the home's acceptance of medicare payments to help
defray costs did not prevent it from meeting the criteria of a
purely public charity."5
Regardless of whether it secures their entitlement to real es-
tate tax exemptions, institutions of higher learning in Pennsylva-
nia should also reassess and reevaluate themselves. Perhaps if
the courts saw less dollar signs and more working minds, they
would be less inclined to exclude schools from the definition of a
purely public charity.
As the court in Washington & Jefferson explained, however,
applying the definition of a purely public charity to colleges and
universities is a complex problem:
Just as very few, if any, institutions of learning do not fit neatly into
neat categories entitling them to exemption, so W[ashington and)
J[efferson] has attributes which in some instances seem to call for ex-
emption and other attributes which do not. Even though the college with
its historic beginning was founded by public charity, it has grown into an
enterprise of big business. Of itself, this factor does not take away an ex-
emption status; nevertheless the changes are dramatic and point up the
complexity of the problem."
It is clear, however, that change is needed in American higher
education, but more funds and better equipment are not going to
cause the change. If American education is going to change, the
people running it must change. They must stop looking at stu-
dents as statistics and stop measuring them by the revenue they
147. Id.
148. St. Margaret Seneca Place v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals &
Review, 640 A.2d 380 (Pa. 1994).
149. Seneca Place, 640 A.2d at 382.
150. Id. at 382-85. The trial court had found that the nursing home was com-
mitted to serving all applicants without regard for their financial means. Id.
151. Washington & Jefferson, 74 Wash. Cty. Rep. at 126.
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generate. They must look at students, first and foremost, as indi-
viduals who have something to give, to both the school and the
community. Only then will colleges and universities be "purely
public charities" and thus entitled to tax exempt status.
The following passage explains the potential of higher educa-
tion:
[Olnly universities, or institutions like them, can discover the knowledge
on which creative solutions rest and only they can educate the men and
women who will eventually make the critical decisions .... Only educa-
tion can work simultaneously to develop intellectual capacities, awaken
new interests, life aspirations, provoke important questions, deepen un-
derstanding - and these, not the reflected lustre of the institution or the
influence of its alumni, must be the university's true contribution to its
students.'52
This potential should not be wasted. Those institutions that
choose to ignore it are of benefit to no one but themselves. An
institution that pursues and accomplishes a mission such as that
described above, however, should be treated as a purely public
charity and should be entitled to tax-exempt status. Because, in
striving to achieve academic excellence and fostering knowledge
and understanding in its students, institutions of higher learning
are serving a function that only they can serve and are providing
to the public a benefit that only they can provide.
Alison T. Fenton
152. Bok, cited at note 135, at 40-41.
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